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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. R. OWENS TRUCKING COR-
PORATION, 
Plaintiff and Appelant 
vs. 
HAROLD STEWART, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF RIDSPONDENT 
srrATEM:ENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
No .. 
12988 
The entire v:oir dire of the jury panel (Tr. 2 through 
29) contains essential facts for proper consideration of 
this appeal. 
The entire "insurance" incident, as reflected in the 
transcript (Tr. 30 - 31) is important, and for convenience 
we quote the transcrip as follows: 
"A Yes. Well, we had to bring another truck 
down and we thought maybe we'd switch the 
load but then v,-e decided that the frame w 
bent. We never did get it back together aga 
when it came apart, we had experience with tb 
before so we decided we'd have to get it back 1 
on its own power, so we put new bearings in 
then we to1ok it up to our shop in Roy and wa. 
ed. I talked to Mr. Stewart's insurance man ai 
he indicated that he was going to take care 1 
it at the time and-
THE COURT: Just a moment. 
MR. ALSUP: Your Honor, I am sorry 
THE, COURT: Let me say this to yo 
Mr. Owens, just answer the questions that a1 
asked of you, don't volunteer. 
THE WITNE'8S: All right. 
MR. ALSUP : There is no insurance ir 
volved in this case, your Honor, may we mak 
that clear? 
THE COURT: Well, let me say this ti 
you, members of the jury, you have two state 
ments regarding insurance, you are to disre 
gard both of them. Whether or not there is an; 
insurance in this lawsuit or any lawsuit is oJ 
no materiality to the jury, disregard it and yo1 
are so instructed. Now you may proceed." 
The defendant's insurance policy did not exceed thE 
prayer of the complaint, but this isn't important. vVhai 
is important is that he did in fact have insurance. 
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\Vith these additions, we accept plaintiff's statement 
of facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING ON MO-
TIONS RAISED BY THE "INSURANCE". 
STATEMENT 
We are not certain just what relief plaintiff request-
ed of the trial Judge. We don't see any motion from the 
plaintiff in the transcript. Nonetheless, we assume that 
plaintiff intended to move the Court for a mistrial, based 
upon the statement made by defendant's attorney con-
cerning insurance. This assumption is based upon the 
proceedings taken before the Oourt in the absence of the 
jury, and reported at page 2, 3 and 4 of the seeond re-
porter's transcript, dated January 23, 1973. At this hear-
ing the Court tO'ok the question raised by plaintiff under 
advisement and invited plaintiff to submit authority. 
None was submitted. The judgment on the verdict was 
permitted to stand, and so we assume that we deal here 
with a motion for mistrial by plaintiff and a denial there-
of by the Court and an assignment of error thereon by 
the plaintiff. 
The undersigned, who was defendant's counsel and 
who made the questiioned statement eoncerning insur-
ance, does not seek to justify that statement. Admitted-
ly, the statement as eontained in the transcript i~ not 
what I thought I said, and certainly not what I intended 
saying; but obviously it is what I did s·ay. The error, 
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from the lawyer's standpoint, is not just what 'vas said, 
but rather, it is that anything at all was said, other than 
asking the Court to a<lmonish the jury to disregard the 
inference 'Of insurance created by plaintiff's statement. 
Therefore, any attempt to justify the statement would 
merely compound the blunder. 
The important question on this appeal, however, i1i 
whether or not the Court committed error in its handling 
·of the problem created. What the Court did is reported 
at page 31 of the transcript, and we quote: 
"THE COURT: Well, let me say this to you, 
members of the jury, you have two statemenh 
regarding insurance, you are to disregard both 
of them. Whether or not there is any insur-
ance in this lawsuit or any lawsuit is of no ma-
teriality to the jury, disregard it and you are 
so instructed. Now you may proceed." 
Without justifying any statement made by or on be-
half of either party, and without quarrelling with any 
·of the authorities cited by plaintiff in his Brief, we sub-
mit that the jury, if at all interested in the question, 
would be just as inclined, or more inclined, to conclude 
from the statement and the counter-statement that there 
was insurance, rather than that there was no insurance; 
and in any event the Court properly handled the matter 
with its cautionary admonition. 
In urging that there was no reversible error inV'Olve4 
in the incident, we do not ask the Court to endorse the de-
fendant's method of handling the insurance problem as 
a model. We only say that in this particular case, con-
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sidering what was said on both sides, and then review-
ing the conduct of the trial J u<lge in seeking a f.air trial, 
there was no reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOr:L1ION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Prior to the trial, plaintiff moved for a change of 
venue on the ground that a fair trial could not be had 
in Millard County. He moved the Court for a transfer 
to Weber County, where he resides. The substance of 
pl•aintiff's complaint was and is that in a rural livestock 
area of relatively limited population, a fair jury could 
not and cannot be had because most juries have some 
acquaintanceship with the defendant, and would, like 
defendant, be engaged in some phase of the livestock 
1business. 
No affidavit was filed with this motion made by the 
plaintiff, and no evidence was offered to support it. 
Since some factual foundation is required for any 
court action, and since none was presented by the plain-
tiff in support of his motion for change of venue, the 
eourt was asked by the plaintiff to say that presumptive-
ly the people of Millard County are so prejudiced against 
outsiders that a fair trial there is not possible. Reduced 
to the facts .of this case, the court was asked by plaintiff 
to say: In a case involving damage allegedly caused by 
a cow on the highway and defective fencing, the people 
of Millard County, Utah being livestock people predomi-
nantly and having some acquaintanceship with defendant 
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by reason of the limited population in the area, are p 
judiced in favor of the defendant. Therefore, a fair ti 
by a jury in Millard County is impossible. 
This is an awful indictment against not only a co 
munity of people, but also against our jury system. '1 
integrity of our jury system is just not that tenuo 
Nothing in our years of working under that system-
in our human experience-tells us that man is so d 
honest or so weak as to be influenced to the point of ' 
tive prejudice by any casual acquaintance or any rem< 
business interest. 
We who are so sensitive-we who scream in mor 
anquish at the mere mention of the word "insuranc1 
for example-do great injustice to the system. The tn 
is, people are basically decent and honest. When a pre 
lem is put to them they make an honest, sincere effort 
reach a fair solution. They do this without regard 
inconsequenhal considerations and local influences. 
A person's right to a trial in his own community 
important to him. It is important enough to warrant 
constitutional guaranty (Utah Constitution, Article XL 
Sec. 1). A court should give fair consideration to fac 
showing proper reason for a change of venue. But loc 
venue should not be lightly regarded. ·There are so mai 
reasons for a local determination of controversies. He 
wrong it would be to say to a people of a community th 
any case brought against any one of you by a non-reE 
dent must be tried outside your community, at addition 
expense and at inoonvenience to you, because you ~ 
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raise cattle here and you all have some acquaintance with 
each other. In a case like ours, the condition of the fence 
is very important fo the fad trier. You can show a jury 
photographs of a fence in a distance county, or you can, 
under proper direction, take a jury out and show it the 
fence. \iVhich is the better evidence~ Pictures can be 
tlistorted and can be so misleading. The most reliable 
evidence is the actual view, and this requires a local 
trial. Our search always is for the truth, and 1absent 
facts showing actual bias, truth can best be arrived at 
through local trial. This is why our jury system works 
quite well. 
In any event, the question in our case comes down 
to this, 'as it does in all these cases involving this ques-
tion: Does the record in this case reflect any basic un-
fairn~ss 0! We ref er to the examination of the jury panel 
by the trial Judge, as shown in the transcript, pages 2 
to 29, inclusive. We submit this record discloses: 
1. A careful conduct of the voir dire by the trial 
Judge, with a sincere effort toward fairness. and cer-
tainly no discretionary abuse; and 
2. A jury panel, after dismissals for cause by the 
0ourt, that evidenced a desire and an ability to perform 
the jury function. 
All cases on this subject say about the same thing: 
the trial Judge is to be supported unless his ruling shows 
an abuse of his discretion of such 1a nature as to prevent 
a fair trial for the complaining party. 
The opinion in Chamblee v. Stocks, 9 Utah 2d 342, 
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334 Pac. 2d 980, expresses this doctrine of fairness as 
well as any case, and factually it is as close to our case 
as any we find. rrhis case factually is superior from the 
plaintiff's standpoint to our present case, since at least 
there is in the Chamblee case a factual basis given by 
a;ffidavit for the Court to act. We rest our argument, 
without formal conclusion, upon this decision and on the 
voir dire of the jury, pages 2 through 29 of the trans-
cript. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent por-
tion of the opinion in Chambless v. Stocks, as follows: 
"The motion for change of venue was filed 
and argued long before trial and was based on 
an affidavit which, in the words of plaintiff's 
brief, 'set forth* * * the fact that the defendant, 
J·ohn Stocks, was an elected official * * "", that 
he was a member of one of the oldest families 
in Moab and Grand County, and had many 
friends in the community, and that because of 
his official position, relatives and friends * • • 
it would be impossible to have an impartial 
trial.' (Emphasis added.) 
"Change of venue generally is discretionary 
and absent a clear abuse thereof a trial court's 
order denying or granting it will not be disturb-
ed. With nothing more than facts reflected in 
the language quoted above, a trial court would 
not abuse its discretion, in our opinion, by deny-
ing the change. The wisdom of the Court's 
denial here quite clearly was established when 
the jurors were questioned for cause shortly 
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before they were sworn. At that time, although 
all knew or knew of the sheriff, and some were 
1acquainted with him, none evinced any dispo-
sition to try the case other than fairly, on the 
evidence, and under instructions of the trial 
court, - except possibly two prospective jurors, 
- one of whom, although admitting embarrass-
ment to act as venireman, acknowledged an 
ability to transcend it, - he being eliminated 
by the plaintiff's peremptory challenge, and 
the other for cause on motion of defendant. It 
would not be consonant with our traditional 
judicial procedure or complimentary to our 
jury system to deny a man trial by jury of his 
neighbors because he happened to be an official, 
and had friends and relatives in the community. 
* * * " 
Respectfully submitted, 
Daniel A. Alsup 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
1101 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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